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British Policy of Balance of Power 
under the Versailles system and Poland
Katsuhiko MATSUKAWA
Abstract
It is a European tradition for a government of major power to seek in its diplomatic policies for bal-
ance of power among big countries, rather than rule by one super-power.  Ironically it was such a tradi-
tion that mainly caused the two world wars in the 20th century in Europe.  
In this paper I will try to examine the British policies of making balance of power, at the time of
crashed between self determination efforts by the Polish government and the communist international-
ism of the Soviet Russia. It was immediately after the First World War.
Toward the end of the First World War, after collapse of Imperial Russia, the
Bolshevik government was established.  The United Kingdom at first tried to help restore Imperial
establishment of Russia but soon abandoned the efforts, and recognized Bolshevik administration as the
sole legal regime that represented Russia.
The demise of East-West antagonism was welcomed by the British Government, but small countries
such as Baltic states,  Belarus,  Ukraine and Poland were ignored in its policies then. Great Britain com-
promised with Russia that the Soviet government would treat those small countries around it as its own
problems.  Poland, however, could not welcome such a balance of power, because it wanted to decide
its own fate by herself.  
It was this policy of balance of power taken by the British government that led to the Polish warfare
actions against the Bolsheviks.
Warsaw, the capital of Poland, was nearly completely occupied by the communist army of Russia,
but it finally succeeded in fighting them back.  The Polish victory had the meaning of the confirmation
of the Versailles System, which secured the survival of Poland, because of their balance of power policy.
Why was the inter-war period between the two war so short? Why did the second world war break
out so soon?  It was mainly because the U.K. and France tried to maintain the balance of power that had
existed in those days when negotiation with Russia and then Germany, neglecting the rights of those
small countries in the Continent. 
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